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I. INTRODUCTION
Economy in Government has been a driving force behind numerous
studies in various agencies, especially in the Defense Department.
Since the cessation of hostilities in Southeast Asia, pressure has in-
creased, not only for more non-military services from the Government,
but also for a lowering of emphasis on arms and defense. Congress
has responded by severely limiting Defense Department budgets and
imposing restrictions on how the funds are to be used. As a result, the
Services have found it necessary to conduct serious functional and cost
analysis reviews of their operations, paring some activities, consolidat-
ing others, all for the purpose of obtaining increased efficiency and
maintaining effectiveness from limited resources.
Policy guidance on cost effectiveness has carried down through
the Department of the Navy to the Naval Air Systems Command field
activity at Point Mugu, California, the Pacific Missile Test Center
(PMTC). Within the PMTC Command, the Design and Fabrication
Department, a service organization of about 400 civilian personnel,
has undertaken action towards becoming more cost effective. The
Department Head has initiated several studies analyzing function,
methods, cost, performance, etc. , which, together with guidelines
issued from the Command, will be the basis for reshaping the Depart-
ment along lines of an updated enlightened management team. The

result is expected to be a trim organization operating with increased
efficiency, sustaining effectiveness, and giving customers (and the
taxpayers) more output for their money.
The purpose of this study is to analyze that segment of the Design
and Fabrication Department's Resources Office commonly referred to
as "Planning, " make recommendations regarding more effective methods
of accomplishing its function, and submit a report to the head of the
Resources Office and his superior, the Department Head, giving several
action alternatives for management consideration.
Some of the benefits expected to be gained are the following:
1. A single method of selecting task executives.
2. A higher level of direct control by supervisors.
3. Increased responsiveness from subordinates resulting from
a new-found feeling of being part of the organization.
4. More flexibility in utilization of personnel by first-line
supervisors.
5. More commitment on the part of the first-line supervisors
to development of employees.
6. Quicker feedback of task status to task executives.
7. Performance evaluations from the supervisors to whom the
employee's work is most visible.
8. Closer control on overhead charges.




10. Greater awareness on the part of the engineering supervisor
of the production controller's function and workload.
11. Greater awareness on the part of the first-line supervisor of
the quantity and scope of estimates made by the production controller
for outside requests.
12. Improved accuracy of job estimates and status reports leaving
the Department.
The following chapter presents a description of the test center, a
brief history, and an evaluation of the needs required of it by the Navy.
Next, is an analysis of the organization that has evolved. That is
followed by alternatives for organization structure to accommodate the
test center in its Navy mission with specific recommendations.

II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF PACIFIC MISSILE TEST CENTER
The Pacific Missile Test Center had its beginning in 1946 [Ref. 1,
p. iv-vi] when the Naval Air Missile Test Center (NAMTC) was com-
missioned at Point Mugu. Prodded by the effective use of pulse-jet
and rocket powered missiles developed by the Germans during World
War II, the U. S. Navy had consolidated its scattered missile research
groups and formed the Pilot-less Aircraft Unit at a desert air station
near Mojave, California. The unit was moved to Point Mugu because
of significant operating advantages. The more important were the
large open-sea test area, the potential instrumentation sites on the
off-shore islands and on the mainland atop the 11 00 -foot Laguna Peak,
the mild weather, and the proximity to the industrial complex of the
Los Angeles area.
A ten year growth program began in 1948 with a 30 million dollar
appropriation from congress for initial construction of headquarters
buildings, missile project buildings, and sophisticated laboratory test
facilities. Matching the Center's continuing growth was the develop-
ment of the Navy missile inventory, with such historical names as
Lark, Loon (American version of the German V-l buzz bomb),
Gargoyle, Rigel, Sparrow I and II, and Regulur I and II. Missiles
were launched seaward from ground-based launchers and then tracked,
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at first simply by observers, later with instrumented cameras, and
finally with extremely accurate radar. Later on, air-launched mis-
siles were mated to aircraft and fired over the sea test range. Help-
ing with the entire operation were some of the very same German
scientists who had developed the V-l and V-2 missiles, and were
brought to this country under "Operation Paperclip. "
In 1958, the Pacific Missile Range (PMR) was established from
the nucleus of NAMTC. Designated a national missile range, its
mission was to provide operating and test range support for the
Department of Defense and other Government agencies for launching,
tracking, and collecting data for guided missiles, satellites, and
space vehicles, underscoring the nation's emerging space program.
Geographically, the range extended from launch facilities at Point
Mugu and at Point Arguello, 90 miles up the coast, seaward to Hawaii
and Kwajalein, and inland to impact areas in Nevada and Utah.
In 195 9, the Navy's missile testing function was separated from
PMR for administrative and funding advantages, with the establish-
ment of the Naval Missile Center as a separate command. Designated
as the Navy's principal organization for the test and evaluation of air
launched missiles, weapon systems, and related devices, the Center
enjoyed continued growth in supporting developmental testing, Navy
acceptance testing, production monitoring flight tests, and in-service
engineering for deployed weapons. Utilizing PMR's well-instrumented
11

sea test range and its own state-of-the-art laboratories, the Center
tested and evaluated a wide variety of current weapons such as
Sparrow III, Bullpup, Sidewinder, Shrike, Walleye, and Phoenix.
The size of the Range was sharply curtailed in 1964 as inter-
service realignments led to the transfer to the Army of two down-
range sites and to the Air Force of the Navy facility at Point Arguello,
tracking stations at Hawaii, and six highly-instrumented tracking ships.
PMR retained a newly-developed underwater range at Hawaii and the
missile range facility at Point Mugu, along with the offshore islands
and one tracking ship.
The Naval Missile Center continued its growth, with a major por-
tion of its effort going to support of the fleet during the war in Viet
Nam. However, as hostilities tapered off and the Department of
Defense share of the nation's budget was trimmed, fewer missile sup-
port programs were needed. Also, by this time the mission of PMR
had become much more Navy oriented, and the potential for cost
saving through recombining of local commands became evident.
Thus, in 1975 the Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC) was
established, combining the Naval Missile Center, the Pacific Missile
Range, and as a subordinate command, the Naval Air Station. With a
Fiscal Year 1976 budget of 214 million dollars, the Center operates
on a matrix management system, with central project management
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The organization is comprised of two staff groups, four major engi-
neering directorates, the Naval Air Station, the Pacific Missile
Range Facility in Hawaii, and the Marine Aviation Detachment.
Employment is approximately 900 military, 4400 civilian, and 1700
contractor.
Although operating once again as a single command, traces of the
old structure remained, principally because of the funding systems
employed. While about half of the organization operated under Navy-
Industrial Funding (NIF), the other half received institutional funds
under the Resource Management System (RMS) accounting method.
This caused inequities, in that RMS -funded departments charged only
direct labor, their overhead being paid by institutional funding alloca-
tions, while NIF-funded departments charged, as in any commercial
operation, for complete costs including overhead. This apparent
difference in costs caused a shift in workload which had a serious
effect on some departments. The situation was expected to be im-
»
proved with revised accounting methods scheduled for implementation
starting in October 1976. However, in his PMTC master plan [Ref. 2,
p. 1-31], the Commander sounded the warning that, looking to the
future, "Organizations with high indirect costs will have to demon-
strate their worth. "
B. HISTORY OF THE DESIGN AND FABRICATION DEPARTMENT
The Design and Fabrication Department is the Center's central
14

facility for product design, manufacturing, equipment maintenance
and repair, and calibration. Organizationally, the Department is
one of three reporting to the Engineering Applications Directorate,
Figure 1, with the other two being the Photography and Technical
Information Department and the Instrumentation Department. In-
ternally, the Design and Fabrication Department is organized as
shown in Figure 2, with three principal line divisions, Design Engi-
neering, Metric Engineering, Technical Shops, and one staff group
entitled, "Resources Office. "
The Department traces its history back to the earliest days of
the Center, having undergone several changes in name, including
Technical Service Department, Technical Support Directorate, Tech-
nical Support Department, and the present Design and Fabrication
Department (D&FD). From its earliest days, its mission has been
to provide design engineering services, maintenance, and repair in
the fields of electronic, mechanical, and aeronautical engineering,
and prototype manufacturing in these technical fields. This service
was available to any of the other departments on the base and was
occasionally used by other Government activities as well.
Typical of the jobs accomplished by the D&FD have been modifica-
tions of aircraft and the installation in aircraft of special test equip-
ment, a ten-foot square oscillating table fo r the testing of shipboard
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areas, electronic control devices, and launch and retrieval devices for
underwater torpedo-like targets. As an ongoing service, the D&FD
does a considerable amount of repair, calibration and upgrading of
electronic equipment, test equipment, and radar and telemetry systems.
The size of the Design and Fabrication Department has varied
slowly over the years, having tapered off from a peak of about 550
during the 1960's to 369 in June of 1976. Facilities are scattered
throughout several buildings, comprising about 166, 000 square feet of
floor space, including offices, manufacturing spaces, calibration labora-
tories, and antenna test facilities. Capital equipment is valued in the
neighborhood of seven million dollars acquisition cost.
Until July 1975, funding for the Department had been from institu-
tional sources. This provided the funds at the beginning of each fiscal
year to sustain operations throughout the year. Customers were free to
request services by initiating the standard PMR work- request documents.
Only off-station customers were required to reimburse funds, and then
only for direct labor and material. Work was so plentiful that a com-
mand-level priority control board was required to ensure optimum sup-
port over the entire center.
After the consolidation of the Center into PMTC, funding for the
Design and Fabrication Department was changed to the Navy Industrial
Funding system. It became necessary for customers to transfer funds
from their own projects for each work request, and in addition to direct
17

labor and material, they were billed for overhead costs as well. This
additional amount, which not only covered the Department's overhead
costs, but also its share of the Directorate and Command expenses,
was virtually twice the average direct labor rate. Where the customer
previously had paid an average of ten dollars per hour for D&FD ser-
vices, he now paid thirty. The total cost to the Government was the
same; only the accounting procedures had been changed. But under the
former institutional accounting system, the true cost had not been ap-
parent to the user, leading to a "something -for -nothing" attitude.
To further complicate the funding picture, half of the Center re-
mained on institutional funding, concerned with only direct labor and
material charges. To many of the Department's potential customers,
the full rate with overhead seemed excessive and they began to look
elsewhere. Some turned to their own engineers for design work and to
small shop facilities scattered throughout the Center, while others sent
their work outside to contractors. This produced other side effects in
complicating the interdepartmental delineation of functions and facilities.
The change in funding practices, coupled with shrinking Department
of Defense spending, soon had its effect on the Design and Fabrication
Department. The budget for FY1976, shown in Figure 3, was approxi-
mately twelve million dollars for direct labor, material, overhead
(indirect) labor, and other overhead expenses for the Department. An
additional three million dollars was budgeted for the Department's con-
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LABOR 431.013 23.038 5.269.400 307.500 5.576.900
MATERIAL 1.878.400 1.878.400
CONTRACTUAL SERVICES 804,500 804.500
TRAINING 400 5.400 3.000 3.400
TRAVEL 102.000 102.000
OTHER









13 ADMINISTRATIVE SALARIES & WAGES 117.626 2.130 1.492.300 1.518.500
14 MISCELLANEOUS LABOR 72.041 552.900 552,500
IS STANOBY TIME 9.908 117.500 117.500
16 ALLOWED TIME 8.607 95.700 95,700
23 OPERATING SUPPLIES 312.600 312.600
24 MINOR EQUIPMENT 128.100 128.100
25 LOOSE I HANO TOOLS 43.800 43.800
31 CONTRACTUAL SERVICES 168.100 168.100
33 EAM AOP RENTALS 4.300 4.300
34 OTHER EQUIPMENT RENTALS 38.600 38.600




13 PRINTING 4 REPRODUCTION 2.500 40.700 43.201)
45 TELEPHONE SERVICES 10.000 10.000
46 INCENTIVE AWAROS 10.100 10.100





53 WATER - POTABLE
55 STEAM
57 SEWAGE DISPOSAL
61 REPAIR & MAINT - BLOGS & GROUNDS 5.500 5.560
63 REPAIR. MAINT. & INSTALL - EQUIP I TOOLS 32.517 354.100 600 47.300 402.000
66 REPAIR 4 MAINT - FURNITURE I FIXTURES 3.1O0 3.100
67 ENGINEERING SERVICES 6.000 6.000
58 ALTERATIONS 42.500 42.561
70
J
BASIC CAPABILITY IMPROVEMENT 954 13.200 7.300 20.500
71 TECHNICAL PROFESSIONAL PROGRAM 977 7.900 7.900
72 MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
74 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 906 11.400 11.400
79 LONG RANGE PLANNING
TOTAL OVERHEAD EXPENSES BEFORE TRANSFERS 267.681 2.130 2.921.100 26.200 494.900 366.100 93.400 3.901.700
NET TRANSFERS (313.100) (106,900) (117.000) (537.000)
TOTAL OVERHEAO EXPENSES AFTER TRANSFERS 2.608.000 20.200 388.000 249.100 93.400 3.364.700
FIGURE 3
FY 1976 BUDGET
DESIGN AND FABRICATION DEPARTMENT
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As a result of the previously expressed customer reactions, the
amount of incoming work did not meet expectations. Figure 4 shows
how the direct labor hours spent on project work never met the budgeted
figures, which had been projected from customer statements of desired
support. Computations (Figure 5) were made from Figure 3 and Fig-
ure 4 data to compare the amount of direct labor as a percentage of
total man-hours for each month, and the average for each quarter. As
can be seen, direct labor dropped from a planned 66% of total labor to
46% for the first quarter, 45% for the second quarter, and 40% for the


















DIRECT LABOR IN SUPPORT OF PROJECTS




DIRECT MAN-HOURS =(491,418+23,038) -12 = 42,871
(FROM FIGURE 3)
INDIRECT MAN-HOURS = (267,681 1 2,130) -12 = 22,484
(FROM FIGURE 3)
TOTAL MONTHLY MAN-HOUR BUDGET =65,355
DIRECT LABOR AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL = 66%
APPLIED LABOR
MONTH PERSONNEL BUDGETED ACTUAL DIRECT AS AVERAGE
AT START MAN-HOURS DIRECT PERCENT FOR
OF QUARTER (ADJUSTED) MAN-HOURS OF TOTAL QUARTER
JUL 410 65,355 21,459 33%
AUG 65,355 31,109 48%
SEP 65,355 36,699 56% 46%
OCT 396 63,123 34,183 54%
NOV 63,123 26,481 42%
DEC 63,123 24,704 39% 45%
JAN 390 62,167 22,884 37%
FEB 62,167 23,899 38%
MAR 62,167 28,467 46% 40%
FIGURE 5




LEI. DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY
Analysis of the changing conditions in the workload indicated that
not only had the quantity of the workload diminished, but the nature of
the work was changing as well. Whereas fewer work requests were
being received in the design engineering fields, an important develop-
ment had come about in the Metric Engineering Division with the estab-
lishment of a "Depot Level Maintenance" program for maintenance,
repair and modification of radar and telemetry systems. Also, a
Command -backed calibration program was developing that would have
a positive impact on the Calibration Center.
Another condition found was that the individual line organizations
were soliciting their own work. While this did indeed bring in some
additional work, it had caused other problems. Accounting measures
and priority guides began to lose their central control. Shops manage-
ment established its own completion dates and the Depot Level Main-
tenance program established its own accounting numbers. Conflict
and confusion resulted.
This study, sponsored by the Department Head, attempts to analyze
the organization operations and suggests means of neutralizing some of
these problems.
The first step of the study was to interview each of the personnel
in the Plans and Workload Branch. For this purpose, an interview
23

form, Appendix A, was developed. The sessions typically lasted about
an hour and were quite productive, yielding not only organizational
duties, but also a number of positive suggestions regarding improve-
ments in department procedural operations.
Next were interviews with supervisors and managers in the three
line divisions which the Resources Office serves, and for this, another
form, Appendix B, was developed. All supervisors in the Design Engi-
neering Division and the Metric Engineering Division and several in the
Technical Shops Division were interviewed, with the purpose of defining
how the services of the Plans and Workload Branch were being utilized
and how these services might be improved.
In a third series of interviews, managers of somewhat similar
facilities were visited to determine what methods were being used
elsewhere, both in the Navy and in private industry.
Literature searched included current textbooks, library reference
books, articles from business periodicals, and reports from the Defense
Documentation Center. This material was blended together to formulate




IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ORGANIZATION
A. FUNCTION OF THE PLANS AND WORKLOAD BRANCH
The Plans and Workload Branch is primarily responsible for
receiving incoming work requests, coordinating priorities, coordinat-
ing assignment of cognizance to the proper engineering section, manag-
ing tasks for which no engineering is required, and assisting in the
procurement of manufacturing materials. With approximately twenty-
two positions, the Branch is divided into two main parts, the Project
Workload Section and the Maintenance Workload Section, and one small
group, the Contracts and Materials Section (see Figure 6). At the
time of the interviews, each of the two major sections had three sub-
groups of skills in addition to a clerk-typist. The most influential
sub-group, the Production Controllers (informally called Planner
-
Estimators), work very closely with people in the engineering divisions,
assisting the engineering task executives. They also manage a number
of tasks for which no engineering is required. A smaller sub-group of
Production Controllers, usually referred to as Schedulers, work closely
with the Technical Shops Division supervisors and planners, coordinat-
ing shop inputs directly with requestors on minor jobs and with the
Planner- Estimator on major jobs. The third and smallest sub-group,
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ORGANIZATION OF PLANS AND WORKLOAD BRANCH
26

Schedulers by pick-up and receipt of equipment for repair and calibra-
tion from customers, making truck pick-ups on emergency material
purchases, and delivering completed products. Division of work
between the two sections is based on the relative involvement of the
two engineering divisions. The Contracts and Materials Section coor-
dinates the processing of material requests and contract requests
between the Design and Fabrication Department and the Supply Depart-
ment, and performs follow-up action as requested. A few months
earlier, it had been staffed by two equipment specialists and one clerk,
but at the time of the interview it was down to only one equipment
specialist and one clerk. Except for clerical support, the Section
serves principally the Project Workload Section, where the members
report for supervision. The clerk types material forms, serves as
the Resources Office Timekeeper, and assists the work order proces-
sing clerk in the other two sections. Formerly one equipment specialist
did materials requisitioning follow-up for the Maintenance Workload
Section, but recently the Maintenance Production Controllers, in order
to eliminate processing steps began doing their own materials recording
and follow-up. As a result, one of the equipment specialist positions
was eliminated on a trial basis. However, that function should be ob-
served closely, because accelerating NIF materials accounting require-
ments could create a need for that position to be reinstated.
27

B. TASK MANAGEMENT IN THE DESIGN AND FABRICATION
DEPARTMENT
For all incoming work, the head of the Plans and Workload Branch
talks with the requestor, assesses the task, reviews the adequacy of
work request documents, checks to see if prior contact has been made
elsewhere in the Department, and looks for any other salient features.
By copy of the work request, he initiates action in the Financial Branch,
where accounting information is coordinated with the PMTC Comptroller
and the requesting department financial staff.
Assignment of the person responsible for task direction and perform-
ance, the task executive, is coordinated by the Plans and Workload
Branch Head. This is a critical process since two distinct methods of
task management are used. If engineering work is part of the task,
responsibility for the task is given either to the Design Engineering
Division or the Metric Engineering Division. But if manufacturing is
the principal requirement and engineering is not required, responsibil-
ity remains in the Plans and Workload Branch. Often the decision is
obvious, but if not, it is made by the line managers in the engineer-
ing divisions. Once this basic choice has been made, the engineering
line managers select one of their personnel as a task executive, and
for manufacture-only tasks the Plans and Workload Branch Head selects
one of his production controllers to serve as task executive.
Thus two distinct methods for task management have evolved; one
led by an -engineer in a line division, and the other led by a production
28

controller in a staff office. As a further complication, these same
production controllers who manage tasks of their own, also assist the
engineers in prosecuting their tasks by issuing blueprints and shop
instructions, ordering manufacturing materials, and coordinating
priority problems. This dual method of task management was one of
the key features to be resolved by the study.
C. ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE DESIGN AND FABRICATION
DEPARTMENT
Having thus been given the authority for managing the new task,
the task executive leads it through to completion. He has considerable
freedom in deciding methods of accomplishing the work, and should
the nature of the product require design expertise in other fields, he
can request assistance from technicians and draftsmen in his own
group as well as from engineers in other groups. A design team is
formed, cutting across organizational lines within the Department in
a matrix manner.
The assisting engineers serve as sub-task executives, issuing
and monitoring production in their own specialty areas. However, it
is still the task executive who is held accountable for completion of
the entire job. In this capacity, he serves much as a staff assistant
to the Department Head and carries a commensurate amount of
authority.
One of the problems uncovered, however, was that accountability
was not clear in the Design and Fabrication Department. Some task
29

executives felt that they were responsible only to the requestor in
another department and not to their own chain of command. Still
others felt that establishment of priority ratings by the Command-
level priority control board relieved them of all responsibility for
timely completion of their tasks. Clarifying this situation was another
principal item to be addressed.
Organizational concepts taken from the literature and which are




V. ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS FROM THE LITERATURE
APPLICABLE TO THE DESIGN AND FABRICATION DEPARTMENT
The task executive's authority is very similar to that described
by Henry H. Albers [Ref. 3, p. 113] in delineating line and staff
relationships in a military environment. He suggests that the idea
that the line officer commands and the staff officer does not command
is not descriptive of the true situation. Although a line commander is
formally required to respond only to commands from a superior line
officer, he obviously cannot ignore the superior's staff officers. Sug-
gestions from higher level staff officers are rarely taken lightly.
Further, he maintains, every line commander knows that a staff
officer's suggestion can be followed by a formal order in the name of
the superior commander, so that even a staff officer of low rank may
have considerable influence if he comes from headquarters. In the
same manner, the task executive carries substantially more authority
than would be associated with his normal position of design engineer.
In spite of the freedom that goes with the task executive's respon-
sibility, he is still held accountable by the Department Head through
the line management chain. The first level supervisor gives the task
executive wide latitude in accomplishing his assignment, but reserves
the right to intervene under appropriate circumstances. This is very
much as Joseph A. Litterer [Ref. 4, p. 642] describes the practice of
31

"override. " He maintains that, although, higher management can dele,
gate responsibilities, it cannot transfer them, and so the ultimate
responsibility is always retained at the higher level. Essentially the
same concept holds true for authority. Even though certain authority
is designated for lower executives, the higher executive always has
the final authority. He further points out that even in a decentralized
organization where lower executives have a great deal of autonomy
and independence, the exercise of their authorities is always subject
to an override by higher executives.
This concept of a higher, usually latent, overriding authority
provides a useful organizational notion. It is different from the more
common concept of management, wherein the lower executive refers
problems to higher authority for decisions and actions. Under the
override system, the task executive may act quite independently in
pursuing his objectives, but if problems are referred by others to his
supervisor or the Department Head, the task executive is held ac-
countable for his actions.
Numerous references in the literature are found relating to
organizations not unlike the Design and Fabrication Department. An
overriding theme is that no one method of organizing is the ideal for
every situation. Each structure must be tailored to the individual
set of circumstances and group of employees encountered in the
organization. However, studies of the literature help to clarify the
32

definition of labels and lead to a better understanding of similar func-
tions in different organizations.
In determining how a manager chooses among organizational design
alternatives, Michael B. McCaskey [Ref. 5] defines some of the basic
principles. Organizational design, he relates, determines what the
structure and process of an organization will be. The features of an
organization that can be designed include: division into sections and
units, number of levels, location of decision making authority, distri-
bution of and access to information, physical layout of buildings, types
of people recruited, what behaviors are rewarded, and so on. In the
process of designing an organization, managers invent, develop, and
analyze alternative forms for combining these elements. And, as
Herbert A. Simon [Ref. 6] points out, the form must reflect the limits
and capabilities of humans and the characteristics and nature of the
task environment.
Designing a human social organization is extremely complicated.
An organization is a system of interrelated parts such that the design
of one subsystem or of one procedure has ramifications for the other
parts of the system. Furthermore, the criteria by which a system
design is to be evaluated cannot be maximized simultaneously. The
design will never be perfect or final. In short, as McCaskey concludes,
the design of organizational arrangements is intended to devise a com-




But proper organizational structures do not simply evolve. The
right structure, or even a livable structure, as Peter Drucker [Ref. 7,
p. 523] describes it, is no more intuitive than were the Greek temples
or the Gothic cathedrals. The first step, he emphasizes, is not design-
ing the structure. Rather it is to identify and organize the building
blocks of organization, that is, the activities which must be encompas-
sed in the final structure and which, in turn, carry the structural load
of the final edifice. It is not enough to clasify them in the traditional
way of "staff and line. " Like all materials, these building blocks have
their specific characteristics. Depending upon each set of circum-
stances, they belong in different places and fit together in different
ways.
In the matter of determining the distinction between line and staff,
William Sexton [Ref. 8, p. 67] stipulated that the difference between
line and staff is the assignment of roles. Any time two or more people
work together, he maintains, this distinction is a means of determining
who makes decisions directly related to the attainment of end results
and who provides advice and service in making those decisions. Accord-
ing to Sexton, "Line refers to those positions and elements of the or-
ganization which have responsibility and authority and are accountable
for accomplishment of primary objectives. Staff elements are those
which have responsibility and authority for providing advice and service
to the line in the attainment of objectives. "
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In explaining two distinct functions* of staff, Litterer [Ref. 4,
p. 585] states, "One part of the typical concept holds that the function
of staff is to assist the executive in a variety of ways in performing
duties that he would otherwise have to do himself .... A second part
of the general staff concept is for the staff to supply special knowledge,
skill, and the like, needed by an executive. " The former part of this
definition, performing duties that the executive would otherwise have
to do himself, helps to explain why a staff person sometimes appears
to have line authority, just as is found in the Plans and Workload
Branch, where the production controllers sometime serve as task
executives in directing a task. That this function should be line in
nature is argued by Robert C. Sampson [Ref. 9, p. 44].
Clearly, staff people cannot have operating responsi-
bilities. Hence, they cannot participate in deciding, doing,
or controlling, in finance, production, or sales. If they do,
they interfere with line management's right and responsi-
bility in decision making. Nor can staff people issue orders
directly or indirectly to line people through setting policy,
devising standards, or prescribing methods. If they do,
they are taking a line action and interfering with line
superior-subordinate relationships ....
In further clarification of the direct line of authority, a definitive
case was noted in the Organization Manual of the Naval Air Test Center,
Patuxent River, Maryland [Ref. 10, p. TSD-3]. The Technical Support
Directorate is headed by a naval officer. Directly under him, in line,
is the Technical Director, a civilian. Under him are two staff groups




Responsible for the technical quality of the work
of the Directorate . . . Acts as Technical Support Directorate
liaison contact .... Responsible for preparation of the budget
and administration of Directorate funds .... Assigns projects
to the appropriate branches and coordinates their efforts.
Another area to be considered in the problem of designing organiza-
tions arises from the choices available among alternative bases of the
authority structure. The most common way is to group together activ-
ities which bear on a common product, common customer, common
business function, or common process. Each of these bases has
various costs and economies. For example, the functional structure
facilitates the acquisition of specialized inputs, such as engineers in
a variety of disciplines, by sharing them across products or projects.
This feature is very important if the organization is going to develop
high-technology products.
However, this approach has its shortcomings. As described by
Jay Galbraith [Ref. 11, p. 30], the tasks that the organization must
perform require varying amounts of the specialized resources applied
in varying sequences. With the functional structure, fully utilizing
these specialist resources and also completing all tasks on time is all
but impossible. On the other hand, the product or project form of
organization has exactly the opposite set of benefits and drawbacks.
It facilitates coordination among specialties to achieve on- time com-
pletion and to meet budget targets. But if each project requires the
use of engineering specialists on a less than full-time basis, each
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must hire its own engineers and thereby incur duplication costs. In
addition, nobody is responsible for long-run technical development of
the specialties. Thus, each form of organization has its own set of
advantages and disadvantages. Managers usually make a judgement as
to whether a technical development or schedule completion is more
important and chose the appropriate form.
Galbraith further points out that aerospace firms faced a situation
in the space program of the 1960's where both technical performance
and timely completion were important. One result, which attempts to
combine the benefits of both types of organization, was the matrix form
of organization. Shull and Judd [Ref. 12, p. 65] describe the matrix
in its most elementary form as a cross-hatch of structural elements,
with discipline or functional units forming the vertical dimensions, and
product or project units providing the horizontal dimensions. The
underlying rationale of the matrix structure, as explained by J. L.
Gray [Ref. 13, p. 73-82], is that objectives are best met if the or-
ganization's resources can be oriented toward those objectives without
regard to traditional hierarchical constraints. The organization
structure is viewed as a means to an end and can readily be adapted
to a changing environment. Whereas bureaucracies are organized
around functions and hierarchical positions, matrix organizations are
organized around problems or projects and the person who has the
expertise relevant to the problem.
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Diagramatically, the basic matrix organization is represented by
the chart of Figure 7, adapted from Chris Argyris [Ref. 14, p. 18-23].
It shows how project teams can be composed of members from various
functional groups, with the team leader being selected as the most ap-
propriate for the particular task. Since resources are organized around
specific projects, the organization is continually changing as projects
are completed and resources are deployed to new or other current
projects.
The usefulness of the team approach is further underscored by
Drucker [Ref. 7, p. 569] as he states that the area where team design
as a complement to functional organization is likely to make the great-
est contribution is in knowledge work. The knowledge organization is
likely to balance "function" as a man's "home" with "team" as his
"place of work. " The functional organization also has a challenge in
maintaining a level workload to keep the staff meaningfully occupied
and to retain qualified people. This is especially true in the Govern-
ment, compared to private industry, as there is little freedom to
expand or contract in meeting changing workload conditions.
This challenge requires better functional management. There is
great need for concern with, and management of, the specialists them-
selves. Do they work on the truly important things, or is much of
their time wasted? Do they do over again what they already know how
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capacity? Are they being used productively, or are they just being
kept busy? And are they being fully developed as professionals and
as persons ?
As for the technical expert in a functional group being effective in
leading a task, it was found by Dalton, Lawrence, and Lorsch [Ref. 15,
p. 11] that in all the high- performing organizations, the individuals
primarily involved in resolving conflicts, whether they were a common
superior in the hierarchy or persons in special integrating positions,
had influence based to a large extent on their perceived competence and
knowledge. This was in contrast to the less effective organizations
where such persons usually drew their power solely from their positions
or from their control over scarce resources. Reasons such as these
might well explain the effectiveness of many of the engineering task
executives in the Design and Fabrication Department even though their
authority is not clear on the organization chart.
In further clarifying the matrix concept, Galbraith [Ref. 16, p. 127]
gave the following description of a central office for the control of
products or programs, the Program Manager's Office:
This group collects information for the general manager
and aids in the integration of the functions. In addition, the
program manager maintains information needed by Marketing
and represents the Branch to the customer. The Program
Manager chairs a committee consisting of the functional
scheduling groups and Marketing. This committee decides
on internal start and finish dates for each customer order.
These dates become the schedule that handles the second-
order sequential interdependence. Then each group breaks




Central control such as that described above by Galbraith was not
utilized in the Design and Fabrication Department. Instead, control
had been spread on an individual task basis to the various functional
engineers, and the higher line managers were often little concerned
with most of the tasks.
This division of the task executive's responsibility between func-
tional effort and program management was an important point with
Peter Drucker [Ref. 7, p. 570]. He relates that the knowledge or-
ganization will increasingly have two axes: a functional one, manag-
ing the man and his knowledge; and the other one the team, managing
work and task. While this saves the functional principle and makes
it fully effective, it certainly requires strong, professional, effective,
functional managers. It is the key, in all probability, to making
functional skill fully effective in the knowledge organization.
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VI. OBSERVATIONS FROM OTHER INDUSTRIAL FIRMS
In order to compare recommendations from the literature with what
is actually being used in practice, several industrial firms were visited
and their organizational structures studied. Following is a listing of
these visits:
1. L. M. Dearing and Associates, Studio City, California; a
small manufacturing and sales company dealing in electronic timing
devices for Navy instrumentation cameras and in solar heating devices.
2. McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, Huntington Beach,
California; missile manufacturing and instrumentation.
3. Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, California; Engineering
Prototype Division of the Engineering Department; manufacturing of pro-
totype equipment and missile components.
4. Northrop Corporation, Ventura Division; Newbury Park,
California; manufacturer of pilot-less aircraft missile targets, under-
water targets for torpedos, and aircraft sub-assemblies.
5. Raytheon Corporation, Oxnard Facility, Oxnard, California;
manufacturer of test equipment and missile components.
A representative visit is described below, but for more detail an
account of what was found at each location pertaining to the study has
been included as Appendix C.
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Typical of the organizational structure found most often was that
of Raytheon's Oxnard Facility, shown in essence in Figure 8. Rather
than utilizing team leaders in the various functional departments, such
as was done in the Design and Fabrication Department, Raytheon brought
all of them together into a separate line group called the Program Office,
which reported directly to the plant manager and was considered to be on
an equal level with the operating functional departments. The program
manager was in charge of a project from the time a request for quote
was first received until the finished product was delivered. He coor-
dinated the estimate with the functional departments, prepared overall
schedule charts, and issued work orders to each of the departments.
The department heads did their own planning and scheduling within the
overall plan and, having participated in the original estimate, felt com-
mitted to the cost and time estimates.
Common to all the firms visited was this sense of commitment felt
by the line managers in supporting the programs. Another salient
feature, demonstrated in the Raytheon system, was that most program
managers reported to the same supervisor, thereby providing the effec-
tive guidance shown in the prior section as being extremely important
to Peter Drucker.
In summary, these findings from industrial practice, together with
those from the literature and the in-house interviews, form the basis


















































ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AT RAYTHEON, OXNARD FACILITY
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VII. PROPOSAL FOR REORGANIZATION
A. DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES
The alternatives were developed with the goal of providing a more
uniform system of responsibility and accountability, one which would
increase the economy of operation. Though the study was originally
addressed only to the Resources Office, the proposals soon encompassed
the three line divisions. A number of alternatives were developed in
order to give the Resources Officer and the Department Head more
freedom in selecting the appropriate action.
Listed in order of scope and impact on the organization, the alter-
natives are given below:
1. Consolidate Plans and Workload Branch
As a very basic step, the Plans and Workload Branch should be
consolidated under one supervisor. At the time the interviews were
made the Branch contained three sections. One had only two people in
it and had no supervisor. The other two were larger and similar to each
other with one supporting the Design Engineering Division and the other
supporting the Metric Engineering Division. Only one section had a full-
time supervisor, and it was likely that he would be retiring soon.
The production controllers (planner- estimators) already did
very similar work, but supported different engineering divisions. Con-
solidation would allow the supervisor to shift manpower more readily
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as required by changing workload and to combine filing systems and
clerical support. That a need for this kind of flexibility was already
apparent is shown by the awkward assignment of a man from one section
to do work for both sections, giving him, in effect, two supervisors.
Consolidation could provide more uniform application of training received
by Branch personnel. For example, some have received specialized
training in planning and preparation of procurement packages, and the
Department might well benefit if this information were disseminated and
used more uniformly throughout the Branch.
Schedulers and production dispatchers could also be reassigned
as the need arose. As a further advantage, one or both of the equipment
specialist positions could be eliminated if the present experiment proves
successful in having the planner -estimators process their own material
requests.
Since the Branch Head was already personally supervising most
of the Branch personnel and the total workload was less than in previous
years, an improved and more economical operation would be obtained
by not replacing the one section head when he retires and consolidating
the entire group under the one branch head.
2. Reassign Schedulers and Production Dispatchers
In addition to the above recommendation, the schedulers should
be reassigned to the manager they most closely support. Although the
schedulers were assigned to the Plans and Workload Branch, their
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primary duties were to receive and schedule work for the Technical
Shops Division, where they also were physically located. Since the
scope of their work was limited to supporting the Technical Shops, they
should report to that division head. This would place the schedulers
organizationally next to the manager they supported and at the same
time emphasize the position of the line manager as being responsible
for accomplishment of work assigned to his division.
The production dispatchers worked principally as assistants
to the schedulers, mostly in the handling of incoming or outgoing equip-
ment and material. This relationship was effective and so it should be
continued, with the production dispatchers being reassigned along with
the schedulers.
3. Reassign Planner -Estimators
As a further step, reassignment should also be made of the
planner-estimators to the line managers they serve. The planner-
estimators were the most influential members of the Plans and Workload
Branch, having contact with requestors, coordinating priorities, and
issuing work to the schedulers. Their scope of responsibility and opera-
tion was in two distinct modes. As mentioned earlier, tasks with no
engineering were assigned to planner -estimators as task executives,
while tasks on which engineering was required were assigned to engineers
in the line divisions, with the planner -estimator serving as an assistant.
This dual method of operation often led to confusion as to whether control
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was in the staff Resources Office or the line divisions. Reassignment
of the planner- estimators to the engineering divisions would allow ac-
countability for all tasks to be vested with the same line managers.
First-level supervisors would be able to assign tasks to either an en-
gineer or a planner- estimator and would be knowledgeable of all work
in his field. The basic matrix of Argyris, previously shown in Figure 7,
would have maximum utility, as teams could be formed readily for any
nature of task. The head of the Plans and Workload Branch would be-
come the Workload Coordinator, receiving all incoming work requests,
coordinating receipt of funding with the Financial Branch, assigning
tasks to the appropriate engineering division, and resolving priority
conflicts with requestors.
4. Establish Marketing and Liaison Office
A marketing and liaison office should be established to improve
inter-departmental relations. This alternative would eliminate the Plans
and Program Branch by effecting the described reassignments and re-
placing the workload coordinator, whose duties would be assumed. This
office would be responsible for selling department services to customers
both within and outside of the Pacific Missile Test Center. In his
marketing capacity, the head of this office would serve as the Depart-
ment's prime public relations specialist, and in his liaison capacity
would serve as a customer relations specialist, coordinating special
customer needs with appropriate division heads. Long-range planning,
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contract administration, and the management information system could
also be centrally located in this office. Because of the broad nature of
the responsibilities, it would be important to have the office headed by
a senior engineer with a broad background. This alternative, in addition
to the prior steps, would help to project the department image.
5. Establish Product and Program Management Division
As the most sweeping alternative, a Product and Program
Management Division should be established. While similar to the above
proposal, this alternative would make the function clearly established
as a line division rather than as a staff office. The division would have
coordinating, directing, reporting, and financial responsibility for all
tasks (electronic, aeronautical, mechanical, calibration, maintenance,
and quality assurance). Execution of the tasks would remain in the other
three divisions.
This alternative would incorporate the principal features of the
preceding proposals, except that the marketing function would be as-
sumed by the division head, and the liaison function would be assumed
by the individual managers.
One of the principal advantages of this structure would be a
clearly defined central authority that could speak for any function in
the Department. Also, the Department's one continuing program man-
agement function, depot level maintenance of radar and telemetry sys-
tems, would be raised to a more visible level in the Department.
49

A possible disadvantage, on the other hand, would be the addi-
tion of another link in the chain of communications. It would, however,
give a structure very similar to what has found widespread acceptance
in industry.
B. THE PERCEIVED NEEDS OF THE DEPARTMENT
Throughout the interviewing process, the needs of the Department
expressed most often were twofold. First was a desire to see a unifica-
tion of the Department's objectives and operations, and second was a
re uction of the Department's overhead rate in order to be more
competitive.
Fragmentation of the Department's efforts had been sensed by many
as placing one group from the organization in competition with another,
to the detriment of the whole. As workload had tapered off, marketing
for new work had been done on an individual basis with varying degrees
of success. While this was helping to keep more skills properly utilized,
the feeling was prevalent that work was being guarded jealously and not
being accomplished in the most efficient manner.
A large staff at the Department level was seen by many as adding
more than necessary to the overhead rate. Most felt that the functions
accomplished by the Resources Office were vital to the operation of the
Department, but might be accomplished more efficiently under the direc-
tion of a cost-conscious manager in a line division. And as a side bene-
fit, distribution of staff people to the line organizations would dampen
outside criticism of a large staff group.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT
In considering what would be best for the long-term health of the
Department, consideration was also given to the present climate, as
expressed in the interviews. Some of the ideas formulated in the alter-
natives were perhaps too far-reaching, considering adverse reaction to
program management attempts in other sectors of the Center.
Accordingly, two of the alternatives are emphasized for manage-
ment consideration. First, for moderate improvement with only minor
shifting of personnel, alternative 2 is recommended, involving consolida-
tion of the Plans and Workload Branch and reassignment of the sched-
ulers and the production dispatchers to the line divisions. Second, if
a more extensive reorganization is acceptable, then alternative 4 is
considered best, with the establishment of a marketing and liaison office.
But if it becomes impossible to establish the engineering manager position
as recommended, then an acceptable fall-back position would be alter-
native 3.
Accountability was considered of paramount importance in any re-
organization plan. It seemed essential that task executives and their
supervisors should be held accountable for the technical, financial, and
managerial control of their tasks, and that this responsibility should
extend directly upwards through the line managers to the Department Head.
Control was the other feature essential to the plan. It was felt that
managers needed the freedom to schedule operations in their own area
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within an overall plan, but without the detailed dictates of a staff person,
someone who is outside of his own chain of command. Assistance by-
scheduling specialists was considered appropriate, but it is the line
manager who should have the control and be held accountable.
Both of the recommended alternatives, number 2 to some extent,
and especially number 4, would make long strides towards obtaining
effective accountability and control. And as a long-term gain, even




INTERVIEW FORM FOR PLANS AND WORKLOAD BRANCH
NAME POSITION
1. FUNCTION
a. What is your function as you see it? Proportion of time in
each area?
b. What do you believe is the most important purpose of your own
job functions?
2. WORKFLOW
a. Do your work assignments come from your immediate
supervisor?
b. If not, from whom?
c. Do day-to-day inputs to your job come via your supervisor,
from someone else in the Department, or someone outside the
Department?
d. Who is the user of your services?
e. Do you ever feel your supervisor has been by-passed when
inputs come directly to you?
3. FUNCTION FOLLOWUP
a. What are some other responsibilities of your position?




c. How does your function fit in with the purpose of your Branch?
d. Are there others in the Department who seem to be doing
work that should be done by you?
e. How has the priority-by- completion- date been working'
f. How adequate is the response to your instructions by other
areas in the Department?
g. Would your instructions have more impact if they were
endorsed by a line manager? How?
h. Do you feel that a task executive from Planning has the
same influence as a task executive from either engineering
division?
i. Would your position of influence be improved if you were
staff to one of the engineering divisions directly?
4. IMPROVEMENT: Do you have any suggestions for improving
operations - - - -
a. Your function?
b. Others' functions?
5. FUNCTION FOLLOWUP: What are some of the other important
functions of your job that we might have missed?
6. M. I.S. : What type of management information systems reports




INTERVIEW FORM FOR SUPERVISORS AND MANAGERS
NAME POSITION
1. How do the Financial Branch and the Plans and Workload Branch
presently support you and the organization under you?
2. How might they better support you?
3. What person or persons within those branches most directly
support you?
4. What advantages /disadvantages would you see from relocating
these persons under your direct supervision?





OPERATION AT OTHER ACTIVITIES
1. L. M. Dearing and Associates . This was a small firm in Los
Angeles that had prospered by developing instrumentation devices,
principally for the Navy. In recent months, they had utilized in-house
talent to develop solar heating devices, enabling them to diversify into
a lucrative commercial venture. A manager was over each of the
divisions, but Dr. Dearing ran the business very much as an individual
entrepreneur.
2. McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company . Located at Huntington
Beach, California, this division of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation
was established for the design, development, manufacturing, and testing
of missile systems. Some of their more well-known products include
the Nike anti-aircraft missile, the Thor ballistic missile, the Delta
satellite-launch missile, and the S-IV-B upper stage for the Saturn
launch vehicle for the Apollo space program.
Most of the McDonnell Douglas programs were rather large,
enabling the company to utilize the matrix method quite effectively.
A key person from each of the functional departments was selected
jointly by the program manager and the functional manager, and he
then became part of the program management team, actually moving
his work station to the team location for the duration of the program.
This added to the cohesive team feeling but still maintained the tie to
the individual's functional department, with which he would be coor-
dinating major work efforts.
For the largest of programs, a more permanent arrangement
was employed. A project team was formed, with all the required
personnel being hired or transferred to the program manager's
payroll. A senior member of the firm, very likely a vice-president,
would be in charge of the program, at an organization level parallel
to the vice-president in charge of the managers of the smaller programs.
3. Naval Weapons Center . At NWC, China Lake, the Engineering
Prototype Division visited was very similar to the Design and Fabrica-
tion Department's Technical Shops Division. This division (consisting
of 115 manufacturing -type employees) included an extensive machine
shop, sheet metal, welding, heat treating, and plating shops, and a
small electronic shop facility. Although they were found to be operating
at low capacity, this shop, with some of its present members, had in
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earlier days accomplished the experimental and first production man-
ufacturing of the Sidewinder missile. At the time of the visit, they
were manufacturing only a wide variety of minor jobs, with no major
jobs having been encountered in some time.
The organization in the Engineering Prototype Division also
reflected the lower workload, as did the lack of a centralized engineer-
ing service group. Where the division formerly employed several
production controllers to receive new work, prepare estimates, and
schedule production, this work was now being done by the individual
shop foremen, due both to the smaller workload and to requestors'
demands for more direct access to shop working levels. Individual
shop foremen were left to resolve scheduling conflicts as best they
could. The result was a rather large shop facility operating at reduced
capacity, which permitted quick response to customers on a wide
variety of small jobs.
Funding for the division was by Navy Industrial Funding (NIF),
but cost reports were minimal and were to a large extent manually
processed. A method had been developed to allow the customer a
choice of a fixed-price contract or a billing to cover actual costs
including overhead. After an initial favorable response to the fixed-
price method, most customers eventually found the actual- cost method
more attractive, preferring to cover cost overruns only on their own
jobs, rather than contribute to a fund that would cover overruns for
others. The manager was proud of their reorganizing to meet chang-
ing demands, but was concerned that the more attractive larger jobs
were being sent out to private contractors. It was not clear whether
the lower workload was due to NIF or to Navy policy encouraging
contracting to the private sector.
4. Raytheon Company, Qxnard Facility . Raytheon's Oxnard Facility
was originally established to support flight-test operations of the
company's Sparrow missile at Point Mugu. Over the years, however,
the facility has taken on work from other parts of the company, so that
repetitive production (mostly of electronic test equipment) had become
eighty percent of the workload. The plant operated on a matrix method
with Contracts, Program Development, Administration, and Controller
offices as staff groups, and the Program Office, Engineering, Man-
ufacturing, Quality Assurance, and Flight Test as line departments
reporting directly to the plant manager. Out of a total of approximately
500 employees, there were 150 in the Manufacturing Department in-
cluding 15 on the production control staff.
A typical job would originate as a "Request for Bid Information, "
coordinated by the Contracts Office. An engineer from the Program
Management Office would then obtain cost and schedule estimates from
each of the operating departments, prepare the complete proposal, and
route it through the Controller, where appropriate mark-ups were
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added, and then back to the Contracts Office. Later, when authoriza-
tion to work was received, documents were forwarded by the Contracts
Office to the Controller, where accounting information was added.
Finally, it would go to the Program Manager, who was assigned
responsibility for accomplishing the job. He then authorized the
Engineering Department to begin work, and the Manufacturing Depart-
ment to prepare for production. After production drawings had been
completed and long-lead-time materials ordered, the Manufacturing
Department ordered the balance of materials, prepared detailed
scheduling plans, initiated production, and monitored progress until
the job was complete. Engineering remained active throughout pro-
duction, answering technical questions and making design changes as
the need arose. But it was the Program Manager who retained
overall responsibility for coordinating, directing, reporting, and
financial control.
The Raytheon organization chart shows the three mentioned
departments to be of equal stature in a line capacity. They operate
in a matrix manner, with the Program Manager drawing his basic
support from the Engineering and Manufacturing Departments, using
the assistance of the Controller, Administration, and Contracts staff
offices, and reporting directly to the plant manager. Since each
department had participated in the estimates and was responsible for
its own detailed scheduling within the overall plan, there was a fairly
strong feeling of commitment toward meeting cost and schedule
objectives.
5. Northrop Corporation, Ventura Division . Northrop Ventura is
the outgrowth of an operation for the design and manufacture of pilot-
less radio controlled aircraft target drones. While the company
still produces a number of aerial targets for the Navy, Air Force,
and several foreign governments, it has expanded into design and
production of underwater systems, such as the Mark 30 underwater
target used by the Navy. It also performs extensive component
manufacturing for the parent Northrop Corporation. With a technical
advantage in the glass fiber reinforced plastics field, the company
produces honeycomb wing panels for the Northrop F-5 aircraft and
honeycomb fairing shapes for the Boeing 747. Other products include
electronic modules for aircraft and parachutes for the Apollo space
capsules.
The Ventura Division consists of several program offices supported
by four major line departments: Engineering, Production Operations,
Financial Management, and Marketing. Although oriented to the man-
ufacture of considerably larger assemblies and sub-assemblies than
the Raytheon Oxnard facility, Northrop Ventura Division operates in
a similar manner. Work comes in through the General Manager to a
Program Office. Operating in a matrix manner the program manager

authorizes, monitors, and controls the work of the Engineering and
Production Operations Departments, who do their own scheduling and
control within the overall plan. Each department is responsible for
meeting cost and time constraints, and each has the ability to utilize
overtime or sub- contracts as necessary in meeting its commitments.
Within the Production Operations Department, two methods of
operation were found, dependent upon whether the production was to
be high-volume standard production or one-of-a-kind pre-production
or prototype work. For high volume or repetitive work, another
matrix within the Department was used, with a product manager coor-
dinating the work of Manufacturing Engineering, Material and Produc-
tion Control, and Production. Estimating and scheduling were done
by Material and Production Control, without consulting production
supervisors. It was generally acknowledged that historical data,
recalled by computer, were appropriate for establishing goals. For
pre-production or minor jobs, however, requirements were sent
directly to that section of Production called Advance Production,
commonly referred to as the "Model Shop. " There a product manager
planned the entire job, including material ordering, scheduling, and
production monitoring.
In either case, cost and schedule estimates submitted by line
managers were occasionally modified by top management to allow for
economic or market conditions, and thus enhancing their bid position.
However, the line managers, having had their input felt that the goals
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